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LENDER LIABILITY AND DISCRETIONARY LENDING:
PUTTING THE GOOD FAITH PERFORMANCE
STANDARD IN PERSPECTIVE
Lenders and borrowers recently have focused their attention upon a
developing area of law that courts have termed "lender liability".' In lender
liability suits, borrowers that have entered into commercial credit transactions assert civil claims against commercial lenders. 2 In early lender liability
suits, borrowers in actions against financial institutions relied on tort theories
like fraud, duress, interference with contractual relations, and misrepresen-

tation.3 In more recent lender liability suits, borrowers have claimed that
1. See generally AaRIcAN BAR ASSOCIATION DrvisIoN OF PRorassIoNAL EDUCATION,
EMERGING THEoRms OF LENDER LiAimY (H. Chaitman ed. 1985) (examining impact that suits
that borrowers have instituted against lenders alleging common law theories of such as fraud,
duress, interference with contracts and undue influence have had upon commercial lending

industry);

AitCiAN BAR ASSOCIATION, LENDER LiABnrry LITIGATION: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

(R. Tufaro ed. 1987) (discussing theories used in recent suits that borrowers have instituted
against lenders); Ebke & Griffin, LenderLiability to Debtors: Toward a ConceptualFramework,
40 Sw. L.J. 775 (1986) (discussing rapid increase in number of multimillion dollar suits that
disgruntled borrowers have initiated against lenders); Granoff, Emerging Theories of Lender
Liability: Flawed Applications of Old Concepts, 104 BANYING L.J. 492 (1987) (discussing
precautions that lenders facing lender liability suits should take so that these lenders can
prepare successful defenses against borrowers' claims of breach of good faith obligation, fraud,
duress and breach of contract).
2. See, e.g., K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 766 (6th Cir. 1985)
(affirming $7.5 million jury verdict against commercial lender for breach of good faith
obligation to borrower); Sanchez-Corea v. Bank of Am., 38 Cal. 3d 892, 910, 215 Cal. Rptr.
679,
-, 701 P.2d 826, 839 (Cal. 1985) (affirming $1 million jury verdict against lender
guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation); State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661,
667 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984) (affirming $19 million jury verdict against lender guilty of fraudulent
misrepresentation, duress, and tortious interference with contractual relations), appealdismissed
by agreement, Mar. 6, 1985.
Lender liability, as a multimillion dollar threat, first gained widespread attention in State
National Bank v. Farah Manufacturing Co. See State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678
S.W.2d 661, 667 ('rex. Civ. App. 1984), appeal dismissed by agreement, Mar. 6, 1985. In
Farah Farah Manufacturing Company, an apparel firm, maintained an action against the State
National Bank of El Paso. In Farah's suit, Farah alleged both fraud and duress when the
bank demanded that the financially troubled company replace its directors. Id. The jury
awarded Farah $18,947,348.77 in damages. Id. at 666. Relying on the common law theories
of fraud, duress, and tortious interference with contract, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
of Texas affirmed the jury verdict in Farah,stating that the lender improperly interfered with
Farah's management by threatening to withhold needed financing from Farah unless Farah's
current management resigned. Id. at 690.
3. See Stirling v. Chemical Bank, 382 F. Supp. 1146, 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 516
F.2d 1396 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that lender who induced resignations of borrower's directors
and officers with fraudulent promise not to call borrower's loans was liable for resulting
injuries to borrower); State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661, 667 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1984) (holding lender liable to borrower based upon theories of fraud, duress, and
tortious interference with contract after lender threatened to declare borrower's loans in default
and remove current management), appeal dismissed by agreement, Mar. 6, 1985.
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lenders have breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing that the
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) implies in every contract. 4 Many of
the cases in which borrowers have asserted that lenders have breached an
implied obligation to perform in good faith in commercial credit transactions
have resulted from the lender's exercise of the lender's discretionary rights
in collecting the balance due on the borrower's debt.5 The discretionary
rights of lenders that borrowers most often target in lender liability suits
include the lender's right to accelerate a debt due at some specific future
date, 6 the lender's right to demand full repayment of a debt not due at a

4. See, e.g., Reid v. Key Bank of S. Maine, 821 F.2d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding
that lender in calling borrower's demand note breached good faith obligation that § 1-208 and
§ 1-203 of the U.C.C. imposed upon lender); K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752,
763 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that lender's exercise of lender's right to refuse to advance funds
against borrower's line of credit without prior notice to borrower constituted breach of lender's
good faith obligation); Centerre Bank v. Distributors, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 42, 48 (Mo. Ct. App.
1085) (holding that lender did not breach obligation of good faith that U.C.C. imposes when
lender exercised right to demand full repayment of demand note); Alaska Statebank v. Fairco,
674 P.2d 288, 292-93 (Alaska 1983) (holding that lender breached good faith obligation by
failing to notify borrower before repossessing collateral); Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Willis Denney
Ford, Inc., 154 Ga. App. 846, 847, 269 S.E.2d 916, 918 (Ct. App. 1980) (holding that § I208's good faith obligation does not alter lender's contractual right to demand full repayment
of borrower's debt that was payable upon demand); First Nat'l Bank v. Twombly, 689 P.2d
1226, 1230 (Mont. 1984) (holding that lender breached good faith obligation when one loan
officer offset loan against borrower's deposit account after another loan officer agreed to
change payment schedule of borrower's loan from single payment to installment payment).
5. See Reid v. Key Bank of S. Maine, 821 F.2d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that
lender in calling borrower's demand note breached good faith obligation that § 1-208 and §1203 of the Uniform Commercial Code imposed upon lender); K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co.,
757 F.2d 752, 763 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that lender's exercise of lender's right to refuse to
advance funds against borrower's line of credit without prior notice to borrower constituted
breach of lender's good faith obligation under U.C.C.); Centerre Bank v. Distributors, Inc.,
705 S.W.2d 42, 48 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that lender did not breach obligation of
good faith that U.C.C. imposes when lender exercised right to demand full repayment of
demand note); Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Willis Denney Ford, Inc., 154 Ga. App. 846, 847, 269
S.E.2d 916, 918 (Ct. App. 1980) (holding that section 1-208's good faith obligation does not
alter lender's contractual right to demand full repayment of borrower's debt that was payable
upon demand); Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Assoc., 289 N.C. 620, 625, 224 S.E.2d
580, 584 (1976) (stating that lender's acceleration of loan balance to increase interest rate
constituted bad faith under U.C.C.); Mitchell v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 688 P.2d 42, 44-45
(Okla. 1984) (holding that lender failed to exercise good faith when repossessing borrower's
farm equipment because lender could not provide evidence of lender's good faith belief that
borrower could not repay debt).
6. See, e.g., Brown v. AVEMCO Inv. Corp., 603 F.2d 1367, 1375 (9th Cir. 1979)
(stating that lender's exercise of contractual right to accelerate borrower's debt upon borrower's
breach of contract term constituted breach of lender's obligation of good faith because lender
did not have good faith belief that borrower would not repay debt in accordance with section
1-208); Alaska Statebank v. Fairco, 674 P.2d 288, 292-93 (Alaska 1983) (holding that lender
breached good faith obligation by failing to notify borrower before accelerating debt and
repossessing borrower's collateral); Smith v. Union State Bank, 452 N.E.2d 1059, 1064 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1983) (holding that section 1-208's good faith obligation limits lender's right to
accelerate debts to instances in which lender believes in good faith that lender's prospect of
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specific future date 7 and the lender's right to refuse to advance funds on
a line of credit without prior notice to the borrower.8 In borrowers' actions
arising from lenders' exercise of discretionary contractual rights, borrowers
have alleged that although the lenders' collection actions, did not violate
the express provisions of the loan agreement that governed the lenderborrower relationship, the lenders' actions did violate the lenders' implied
obligation under the U.C.C. to deal with the borrower in good faith.9 In
response to borrowers' actions against lenders who allegedly have violated
an implied obligation of good faith, several courts have applied the U.C.C.'s
good faith provisions to alter the express terms of lending agreements. 10

full repayment is impaired); Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Assoc., 289 N.C. 620, 625,
224 S.E.2d 580, 584 (1976) (stating that lender's exercise of lender's right to accelerate
delinquent loan balance constituted breach of lender's good faith obligation under U.C.C.);
State Bank v. Woolsey, 565 P.2d 413, 417-18 (Utah 1977) (holding that good faith obligation
in § 1-208 of U.C.C. applied to lender's decision to accelerate borrower's debt).
7. See, e.g., Reid v. Key Bank of S. Maine, 821 F.2d 9, 12 (lst Cir. 1987) (holding
that lender in calling borrower's demand note breached good faith obligation that § 1-208 and
§ 1-203 of U.C.C. imposed upon lender); Flagship Nat'l Bank v. Gray Distrib. Sys. Inc., 485
So. 2d 1336, 1340 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that good faith obligation in § 1-203
of U.C.C. does not apply to demand notes); Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Willis Denney Ford, Inc.,
154 Ga. App. 846, 847, 269 S.E.2d 916, 918 (Ct. App. 1980) (holding that § 1-208's good
faith obligation does not alter lender's contractual right to demand full repayment of borrower's
debt that was payable upon demand); Centerre Bank v. Distributors, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 42, 48
(Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that § 1-203's good faith obligation does not -alter lender's
contractual right to demand full repayment of borrower's debt that was payable upon demand);
Allied Sheet Metal Fabricators, Inc. v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 10 Wash. App. 530, 536, 518
P.2d 734, 738 (holding that § 1-203's good faith obligation does not apply to demand notes),
review denied, 83 Wash. 2d 1013, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 967 (1974).
8. See, e.g., K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 763 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding
that lender's exercise of lender's right to refuse to advance funds against borrower's line of
credit constituted breach of lender's good faith obligation under U.C.C.); Midlantic Nat'l
Bank v. Commonwealth General, 386 So. 2d 31, 34 (Fla. App. 4th Dist. 1980) (stating that
lender could terminate borrower's line of credit without notice to borrower unless loan
agreement specifically stipulated that lender provide borrower prior notice); Grandin Indus.,
Inc. v. Florida Nat'l Bank, 267 So. 2d 26, 29-30 (Fla. App. 4th Dist. 1972) (stating that lender
may refuse to advance funds against borrower's line of credit at will, without prior notice to
borrower).
9. See K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 763 (6th Cir. 1985) (alleging that
lender's exercise of lender's contractual right-to refuse to advance funds against borrower's
line of credit without prior notice to borrower constituted breach of lender's good faith
obligation); Alaska Statebank v. Fairco, 674 P.2d 288, 292-93 (Alaska 1983) (alleging that
lender breached good faith obligation by failing to notify borrower before repossessing
collateral); First Nat'l Bank v. Twombly, 689 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Mont. 1984) (alleging that
lender breached obligation of good faith by exercising lender's contractual right to offset loan
balance against borrower's funds on deposit with lender).
10. See, e.g., K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 763 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding
that lender's exercise of lender's contractual right to refuse to advance funds against borrower's
line of credit without prior notice to borrower constituted breach of lender's good faith
obligation); Brown v. AVEMCO Inv. Corp., 603 F.2d 1367, 1375 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating that
lender's exercise of contractual right to accelerate borrower's debt upon borrower's breach of
contract constituted breach of lender's obligation of good faith under § 1-208 because lender
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Because the lender-borrower relationship largely is contractual in nature,
the good faith provisions of the U.C.C. govern the terms of the agreement

between a lender and a borrower." To balance the perceived need for
minimum standards of good faith behavior in commercial contracts with
the U.C.C.'s goal of promoting the expansion of commerce, the drafters
of the U.C.C. adopted a flexible standard bf good faith.' 2 The drafters of
the U.C.C. adopted a flexible standard of good faith so that contracting
parties could adapt the good faith obligation to meet the particular require-

ments of the parties' situation. 3 Section 1-201(19) of the U.C.C. defines
the U.C.C.'s minimum standard of good faith as "honesty in fact in the
conduct or transaction concerned.' ' 4 Section 1-203 of the U.C.C. extends
section 1-201(19)'s good faith standard to the parties to every contract that
the U.C.C. governs. 5 In addition to the general standard of good faith that

section 1-203 sets forth, other sections of the U.C.C. establish specific

did not have good faith belief that borrower would not repay debt); Alaska Statebank v.
Fairco, 674 P.2d 288, 292-93 (Alaska 1983) (holding that lender breached good faith obligation
by failing to notify borrower before repossessing borrower's collateral despite express provisions

in lending contract which borrower waived right to prior notice).
11. See U.C.C. Preamble (1987) (stating purpose and coverage of U.C.C.); see also
U.C.C. § 1-203 (1987) (imposing obligation of good faith performance upon all parties to

every contract that U.C.C. governs).
12. See U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(b) (1987) (stating that drafters of U.C.C. intended for U.C.C.to
be construed liberally to facilitate commercial expansion). Although according to § 1-102
contracting parties may not disclaim the obligation to perform in good faith, § 1-102 allows
contracting parties to define the requirements of good faith performance within the terms of
a contract. Id. at § 1-102(3). Courts have held that if a lender's behavior conforms with the
express terms of the lending agreement, the lender has not breached the lender's implied duty
of good faith. See Flagship Nat'l Bank v. Gray Distrib. Sys., Inc., 485 So. 2d 1336, 1340
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that U.C.C. § 1-203's good faith obligation does not apply
to demand notes); Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Willis Denney Ford, Inc., 154 Ga. App. 846, 847,
269 S.E.2d 916, 918 (Ct. App. 1980) (holding that § 1-208's good faith obligation does not

alter lender's contractual right to demand full repayment of borrower's debt that was payable
upon demand); Centerre Bank v. Distributors, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 42, 48 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)
(holding that § 1-203's good faith obligation does not alter lender's contractual right to demand
full repayment of borrower's debt that was payable upon demand); but see K.M.C. Co. v.
Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 1985) (relying on U.C.C. § 2-309 to alter express
contract provision which allowed lender to deny borrower's requests for advances against
borrower's line of credit without prior notice to borrower).
13. See Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under
the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. Cm. L. REv. 666, 671-73 (1963) (discussing drafters'

adoption of flexible good faith standard to facilitate commerce).
14. U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1987). The Official Comment to § 1-201(19) of the U.C.C.

suggests that whenever the drafters of the U.C.C. used the term "good faith," the drafters
implied at least the standard that § 1-201(19) sets forth. U.C.C. § 1-201(19) comment 19
(1987).
15. See U.C.C. § 1-203 (1987) (imposing obligation of good faith performance upon all

parties to every contract that the U.C.C. governs); see generally Farnsworth, supra note 13,
at 671-73 (noting that § 1-203 extends good faith provisions to all contracts that U.C.C.

governs); Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and Sales Provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195 (1968) (discussing generally interaction of

U.C.C.'s good faith provisions).
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6
standards of good faith for particular types of commercial transactions.
For example, section 1-208 of the U.C.C. specifically imposes a good faith
obligation upon a lender's exercise of the lender's contractual right to
accelerate a borrower's debt.' 7 Similarly, section 2-309(3) of the U.C.C.
specifically imposes a good faith obligation upon a party to a contract to
provide reasonable prior notice to the other
party to the contract of the
8
party's decision to terminate the contract.'
Article 3 of the U.C.C. specifically addresses the relationship between
commercial lenders and borrowers. 19 Article 3 categorizes contractual agreements between lenders and borrowers either as instruments that are payable
on demand (demand notes), or as instruments that are payable at a definite
time (time notes). ° Section 3-108 describes demand notes as instruments
that contain provisions that require payment upon sight or upon presentation, or as instruments that fail to state a specific time for payment. 2'
Section 3-109(1) describes time notes as instruments which require payment
on or before a stated date, within a fixed period after a stated date, within
a fixed period after sight, at a definite time subject to acceleration, or at
a definite time subject to extension?22

16. See Farnsworth, supra note 13, at 667 (noting that U.C.C. mentions good faith in
at least fifty of 400 U.C.C. sections); see infra notes 17-18 and accompanying text (discussing
§ 1-208's specific good faith obligation that governs lender's right to accelerate borrower's
debt and § 2-309's specific good faith obligation that governs party's right unilaterally to
terminate contract).
17. See U.C.C. § 1-208 (1987) (imposing good faith obligation upon lender's right to
accelerate debt). Section 1-208 states that the acceleration clause phrases "at will" and "when
he deems himself insecure" mean that the lender may accelerate when the lender in good faith
believes that the borrower's ability to repay the borrower's obligation to the lender has been
impaired. Id.
18. See U.C.C. § 2-309(3) (1987) (imposing good faith obligation upon party that
terminates contract). Section 2-309(3) applies the obligation of good faith to a party's right to
terminate a contract by requiring that the terminating party give notice of such termination
to the other party to the contract prior to the unilateral termination of the contract. Id. By
requiring prior reasonable notice of termination, § 2-309 grants the other party to the contract
reasonable time to seek a substitute for the present contract. Id. In addition to requiring
notice before a party unilaterally may terminate a contract, § 2-309(3) invalidates an agreement
to dispense with notice prior to termination if such agreement is unconscionable. Id.
19. See U.C.C. § 3-104 (1987) (stating that Article 3 governs negotiable instruments
including drafts, checks, certificates of deposit and notes).
20. See U.C.C. § 3-104(1)(c) (1987) (stating that negotiable instruments are either payable
upon demand or payable at definite time).
21. U.C.C. § 3-108 (1987). Instruments expressly payable on demand are also demand
instruments. 5 R. ANDERSON, Urimoam COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-108:4 (3d ed. 1984).
22. U.C.C. § 3-109(1) (1987). A note also is payable at a definite time when payment is
made in periodic installments. 5 R. ANDERSoN, supra note 21, at § 3-109:5.
In addition, lenders recently have used a note that combines the features of both time
and demand notes. See West & Haggerty, The "Demandable" Note and the Obligation of
Good Faith, 21 U.C.C. L.J. 99, 113 (1988) (recognizing emergence of notes that contain
features of both demand and time notes). Because Article 3 of the U.C.C. does not address
notes containing both demand features and acceleration features ("demandable" notes), courts
have struggled to determine the appropriate standard by which to judge a lender's collection
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After classifying contractual relationships between borrowers and lenders

either as demand notes or as time notes, the U.C.C. restricts a lender's
discretion in seeking a borrower's repayment under the terms of a time
note. 23 For example, lenders generally include in time notes a provision that
reserves a lender's right to accelerate the due date of the borrower's debt

(acceleration clause). 24 Similarly, lenders generally include in demand notes
provisions that grant the holder of the demand note a right to demand that

the borrower repay the entire loan at any time (demand clause).? Unlike
the holder of a demand note, who has an unrestricted right to demand
repayment of the balance due on the note, under section 1-208 a lender

may exercise its contractual right to accelerate a time note only if the lender
believes in good faith that the borrower will be unable to repay the note

in full. 26 Courts generally agree that section 1-208's obligation of good faith27
and fair dealing applies to a creditor's decision to accelerate a time note.

Although courts generally have found that section 1-208 requires a
lender to have a good faith belief that the borrower's ability to repay the

debt has been impaired before the lender accelerates a time note, courts
disagree whether the good faith provisions of sections 1-208 and 1-203 apply

to a lender's decision to call a demand note. 28 For example, in Fulton

behavior under the terms of a "demandable" note. See id. at 113 (noting that courts have
treated "demandable" notes inconsistently because acceleration and default clauses conflict
with demand character of notes).
23. See U.C.C. § 1-208 (1987) (limiting lender's right to accelerate time note to situations
in which lender believes in good faith that lender's prospect of receiving full repayment is in
jeopardy); supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing good faith limitation that § 1-208
imposes upon lender's right to accelerate time note).
24. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (describing U.C.C.'s requirements for
classification of instrument as time note); see E. REED, R. COTTER, E. GILL, & R. SMrrH,
COMMERCIAL BANKING 332 (2d ed. 1980) (describing significant feature of time note as inclusion
of acceleration clause); see also 5 R. ANDERSON, supra note 17, at § 3-109:24 (stating that
although acceleration clause may state that clause operates automatically upon borrower's
breach of any provision of contract, lender must perform positive act to accelerate due date
of time instrument).
25. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (describing U.C.C.'s requirements for
classification of instrument as demand note); West & Haggerty, supra note 22, at 104-07
(describing significant features of demand notes).
26. See U.C.C. § 1-208 (1987) (imposing good faith limitation on lender's right to
accelerate time notes). See supra notes 17, 23 and accompanying text (describing § 1-208's
limitations on lender's right to accelerate debt at will).
27. See, e.g., Brown v. AVEMCO Inv. Corp., 603 F.2d 1367, 1375 (9th Cir. 1979)
(stating that lender's exercise of contractual right to accelerate borrower's debt upon borrower's
breach of contract term constituted breach of lender's obligation of good faith because lender
did not have good faith belief that borrower would not repay debt in accordance with § 1208); Smith v. Union State Bank, 452 N.E.2d 1059, 1064 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that
§ 1-208's good faith obligation limits lender's right to accelerate debts to instances in which
lender believes in good faith that lender's prospect of full repayment is impaired); State Bank
v. Woolsey, 565 P.2d 413, 417-18 (Utah 1977) (holding that § 1-208's good faith obligation
applies to lender's decision to accelerate borrower's debt).
28. See Flagship Nat'l Bank v. Gray Distrib. Sys. Inc., 485 So.2d 1336, 1340 (Fla. Dist.

1989]

LENDER LIABILITY

1073

National Bank v. Willis Denney Ford29 the Georgia Court of Appeals
examined whether section 1-208's good faith requirement applied to a
lender's decision to call a demand note.30 In Fulton National Bank Willis
Denney Ford (WDF) and Fulton National Bank entered into a floor plan
financing agreement." Under the financing agreement, Fulton National Bank
32
financed WDF's purchase of automobiles from Ford Motor Company.
According to the terms of the floor plan financing agreement, WDF executed
a demand promissory note payable to Fulton National Bank for the purchase
price of each vehicle WDF purchased from Ford Motor Company.3 3 After
WDF executed the note payable to Fulton National Bank, Fulton National
Bank remitted the vehicles' purchase price to Ford Motor Company on
behalf of WDF. 34 The terms of the financing agreement in Fulton National
Bank required that WDF pay Fulton National Bank the amount due on
each note upon WDF's sale of a financed vehicle. 35 In 1974 Fulton National
Bank discovered that WDF had failed to extinguish the debt for each vehicle
upon WDF's sale of the vehicle according to the terms of the financing
agreement.36 Because WDF failed to comply with the terms of the financing

Ct. App. 1986) (holding that § 1-203's good faith obligation does not apply to demand notes);
Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Willis Denney Ford, Inc., 154 Ga. App. 846, 847, 269 S.E.2d 916, 918
(Ct. App. 1980) (holding that § 1-208's good faith obligation does not alter lender's contractual
right to demand full repayment of borrower's debt that was payable upon demand); Centerre
Bank v. Distributors, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 42, 48 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that § 1-203's
good faith obligation does not alter lender's contractual right to demand full repayment of
borrower's debt that was payable upon demand); Allied Sheet Metal Fabricators, Inc. v.
Peoples Nat'l Bank, 10 Wash. App. 530, 536, 518 P.2d 734, 738 (holding that § 1-203's good
faith obligation does not apply to demand notes), review denied, 83 Wash. 2d 1013, cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 967 (1974). But see Reid v. Key Bank of S. Maine, 821 F.2d 9, 12 (1st Cir.
1987) (holding that lender in calling borrower's demand note breached good faith obligation
that § 1-208 and § 1-203 imposed upon lender).
29. 154 Ga. App. 846, 269 S.E.2d 916 (Ct. App. 1980).
30. Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Willis Denney Ford, 154 Ga. App. 846, 269 S.E.2d 916 (Ct.
App. 1980).
31. Id. at 846, 269 S.E.2d at 916. In Fulton National Bank, Willis Denney Ford (WDF)
and Fulton National Bank entered into a financing agreement to purchase inventory for WDF's
automobile dealership. Id.
32. Id. at 846, 269 S.E.2d at 916.
33. Id. at 846, 269 S.E.2d at 917.
34. Id. at 846, 269 S.E.2d at 916-17. In Fulton National Bank when Willis Denney Ford
(WDF) received automobiles from Ford Motor Company (Ford), Ford presented a sight draft
to the bank for the wholesale price of the vehicles that Ford delivered to WDF. Id. After
WDF executed a promissory note and security agreement in favor of Fulton National Bank
covering each automobile that WDF received from Ford, the bank paid the sight draft. Id.
35. Id. at 846, 269 S.E.2d at 917. In Fulton National Bank the bank maintained a
security interest in each vehicle that WDF sold until WDF remitted payment to Fulton National
Bank. Id.
36. Id. at 846, 269 S.E.2d at 917. In Fulton National Bank according to the terms of
the financing agreement between Fulton National Bank and WDF, the bank conducted periodic
audits of WDF's inventory to confirm that WDF possessed each vehicle in which Fulton
National Bank maintained a security interest. Id. During the March 1974 audit of WDF's
inventory, the bank discovered that WDF had sold 56 of the vehicles in which the bank
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agreement, Fulton National Bank terminated the financing agreement and
37
demanded full payment of the balance outstanding on WDF's line of credit.
Two years after Fulton National Bank demanded full payment from
WDF, WDF and WDF's president, Willis Denney, maintained an action
against Fulton National Bank in the Superior Court of Fulton County.38 In
WDF's and Denney's action against Fulton National Bank, WDF and
Denney sought to recover damages that WDF suffered when the bank
terminated WDF's floor plan financing agreement.3 9 Alleging that WDF had
no viable basis for WDF's action, Fulton National Bank moved for summary
judgment. 4° In response to Fulton National Bank's motion, the Superior
Court of Fulton County held that a genuine issue of material fact existed
over whether Fulton National Bank had a duty to act in good faith in
exercising the bank's right under the terms of the loan agreement to demand
repayment of WDF's loan. 4' Accordingly, the trial court denied Fulton
National Bank's motion for summary judgment. 42 Although the court in
Fulton National Bank denied Fulton National Bank's motion for summary
judgment, the court granted Fulton National Bank's request for an interlocutory appeal to the Georgia Court of Appeals on the issue of good
43
faith .
On appeal, Fulton National Bank argued that section 1-208's good faith
obligation did not apply to the holders of demand notes. 4 The Georgia
Court of Appeals in Fulton National Bank reversed the lower court's holding
that an issue of material fact existed over whether the obligation under the
U.C.C. to perform contractual duties in good faith extends to the holder
of a demand instrument.4 5 In determining that the trial court should have

possessed a security interest without remitting to the bank the balance that WDF owed to the
bank for each vehicle. Id. WDF owed Fulton National Bank over $180,000 for the 56 vehicles
that WDF sold without the bank's knowledge. Id.
37. Id. at 847, 269 S.E.2d at 917. In Fulton National Bank, officials of Fulton National
Bank met with Willis Denney, the president of WDF, on several occasions to discuss proposed
changes in WDF's operating procedures to avoid any future breach on WDF's part. Id. When
Denney refused to agree to the bank's proposed changes, the bank gave WDF written notice
of the bank's demand for immediate payment of all of WDF's outstanding demand notes. Id.
WDF secured financing with Ford Motor Credit Company and fully satisfied WDF's indebtedness to Fulton National Bank. Id.
38. See id. at 848, 269 S.E.2d at 918 (discussing WDF's action for damages against
Fulton National Bank).
39. See id. at 848, 269 S.E.2d at 917 (discussing WDF's allegations in WDF's action
against Fulton National Bank).
40. Id. at 848, 269 S.E.2d at 918.
41. See id. at 848, 269 S.E.2d at 918 (discussing Georgia Court of Appeals' holding in
WDF's action against Fulton National Bank).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See id. at 848, 269 S.E.2d at 918 (discussing Fulton National Bank's argument that
holder of demand note's decision to call demand note is not subject to obligation of good
faith that § 1-208 of U.C.C. imposes).
45. See id. (holding that § 1-208's good faith obligation does not alter lender's contractual
right to demand full repayment of borrower's debt that was payable upon demand).

1989]

LENDER LIABILITY

granted Fulton National Bank's motion for summary judgment, the Fulton
National Bank court reasoned that Fulton National Bank's good faith or
lack of good faith in terminating the floor plan agreement between WDF

46
and the bank did not present to the court a genuine issue of material fact.
In reaching this decision, the Georgia Court of Appeals reasoned that

section 1-208's good faith obligation did not apply to the demand notes
that governed the relationship between the bank and WDF because the very

nature of a demand note permits the holder of the demand note to call the
borrower's obligation at any time. 47 After acknowledging that demand notes

are by nature immediately payable, the court in Fulton National Bank
concluded that imposing a good faith obligation upon the lender would

alter the nature of the original loan agreement between the lender and the
4
borrower.

In addition to refusing to apply section 1-208 to the demand provision
of the note, the Fulton National Bank court also rejected WDF's claim that

the obligation of good faith in section 1-203 imposes a general obligation
on lenders to act in good faith in all credit transactions. 49 In rejecting
WDF's claim that section 1-203's good faith obligation applies to lenders

in all credit transactions, the Georgia Court of Appeals reasoned that section
1-203 extends the duty to act in good faith only to obligations that a

contract does not address directly. 0 The court refused to apply section 1203 to the loan agreement between Fulton National Bank and WDF because
specific contract terms regulated Fulton National Bank's right to demand
repayment of WDF's loan." The court further acknowledged that section
3-122 of Georgia's Commercial Code states that the sole duty of a holder

of a demand instrument is to seek repayment of the borrower's obligation
within the applicable statute of limitations. 52 Because Fulton National Bank
exercised the right to demand repayment within the applicable statute of
limitations, the court held that WDF successfully could not assert that

46. See id. at 848-49, 269 S.E.2d at 919 (reasoning that § 1-208's good faith obligation
did not apply to the demand notes because nature of demand note permits holder of demand
note to call borrower's obligation at any time).
47. See id. (finding that § 1-208 of U.C.C. does not apply to demand notes).
48. See id. (concluding that § 1-208's good faith obligation does not apply to demand
notes).
49. See id. (rejecting argument that § 1-203's good faith obligation limits lender's
contractual right to demand repayment). In Fulton National Bank the Georgia Court of
Appeals noted that WDF failed to consider that a demand note is immediately due without
prior notice or demand by the lender. Id.
50. See id. (refusing to apply § 1-203 to obligations that loan agreement between Fulton
National Bank and WDF directly addressed).
51. See id. (refusing to apply § 1-203 to loan agreement between Fulton National Bank
and WDF because specific terms of contract granted .Fulton National Bank right to demand
repayment of WDF's loan).
52. See id. (discussing duties of holders of demand notes under Georgia's Commercial
Code); see also Ga. Code Ann. § 109A-3-122(l)(b) (stating that sole duty of holder of demand
note is to initiate action to collect debt that borrower owed to holder of note within applicable
statute of limitations period).
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Fulton National Bank acted in bad faith in calling WDF's loan.5 3 Finally,
the court in Fulton National Bank determined that applying an obligation
of good faith to the demand provision in the contract between WDF and
Fulton National Bank would require Fulton National Bank to surrender a
54
right that the bank had acquired as a result of free and fair bargaining.
5
Similarly, in Centerre Bank v. Distributors, Inc. the Missouri Court
of Appeals for the Western District of Missouri considered whether section
1-208 applied to a lender's right to call a demand note. 56 In Centerre Bank
Distributors, Inc. (Distributors) and Centerre Bank executed a financing
agreement in 1979 in which Centerre Bank provided Distributors a $900,000
line of credit. 57 The line of credit provided operating capital for Distributors,
which was a supplier of kitchen appliances to builders in the Kansas City
area.5 8 The terms of the financing agreement that Distributors and Centerre
Bank executed required that Distributors sign a promissory note payable to
Centerre Bank upon Centerre Bank's demand. 9 Because of a depression in
the building industry in 1979 and 1980, Distributors' financial condition
deteriorated ° In August 1981 Centerre Bank notified Distributors that
Centerre Bank intended to discontinue Centerre Bank's credit relationship
with Distributors. 61 Because Distributors was unable to secure an alternative

53. Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Willis Denney Ford, 154 Ga. App. 846, 847, 269 S.E.2d 916,
918 (Ct. App. 1980). The court in Fulton National Bank concluded that WDF had no basis
to contest the bank's decision to demand repayment if the bank demanded repayment within
the period of time that the statute of limitations allowed for demand of repayment because
the contract specifically granted Fulton National Bank the right to demand repayment at any
time. Id.
54. Id. In Fulton National Bank the Georgia Court of Appeals stated that WDF's
signature on the demand note evidenced WDF's acceptance of the demand provision. Id. The
court in Fulton National Bank further stated that because WDF freely signed the note containing
a clause that gave Fulton National Bank an unqualified right to demand repayment of WDF's
loan, WDF had no ground to contest Fulton National Bank's decision to call WDF's note.
Id.

55. 705 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
56. Centerre Bank v. Distributors, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 42, 46 (Mo. App. 1985).
57. Id. at 44.
58. Id.

59. Id. In Centerre Bank the bank loan agreement between Centerre Bank and Distributors provided that Distributors would pledge all of Distributors' accounts receivable and
inventory to secure the $900,000 line of credit. Id.
60. Id. at 45. In Centerre Bank Distributors' 1979 financial statement indicated a loss
in excess of $100,000. Id. Upon receipt of Distributors' 1979 financial statement, Centerre
Bank placed Distributors' loan on Centerre Bank's problem loan list. Id. This action by
Centerre Bank indicated that Centerre Bank considered Distributors' loan to have a high
probability of loss. See id. (discussing Distributors' financial condition prior to Centerre Bank's
decision to call Distributors' loan).
61. Id.In addition to the weakening financial condition of Distributors in Centerre
Bank, Centerre Bank was also concerned about the deterioration of Centerre Bank's collateral
for the loan. Id. Because of the depressed state of the building industry, Centerre Bank
conservatively deemed at least 14 percent of Distributors' receivables uncollectible at the time
that Centerre Bank terminated Distributors' line of credit. Id. at 46. In addition, Centerre
Bank was concerned that Distributors' inventory estimates were inaccurate. Id.
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source of financing, Distributors surrendered the assets of Distributors to
Centerre Bank in partial satisfaction of Distributors' debt to Centerre Bank. 62
After liquidating Distributors' assets and applying the proceeds of the
liquidation sale to Distributors' loan balance, Centerre Bank filed a complaint against Distributors in the Circuit Court of Jackson County. 63 In
Centerre Bank's complaint, Centerre Bank sought recovery of the balance
of Distributors' loan from Distributors and various guarantors of the
demand note. 64 In response, Distributors filed a counterclaim against Centerre Bank. 6 Distributors' counterclaim alleged that Centerre Bank's demand
of repayment of the entire loan balance breached Centerre Bank's general
obligation of good faith that section 1-203 implied in the loan agreement
between Distributors and the bank. 6 Distributors contended that in demanding repayment of the note, Centerre Bank failed to act in good faith
because Centerre Bank's loan officers led Distributors to believe that the
bank was willing to work with Distributors to restructure Distributors' loan
and that Distributors' management relied upon the bank's representations
when Distributors' management made financial decisions. 67 The Circuit
Court entered a judgment for Distributors on the counterclaim. 68 Centerre
Bank appealed the trial court's ruling to the Missouri Court of Appeals for
the Western District of Missouri. 69 On appeal, Centerre Bank contended
that the trial court erred in allowing Distributors to assert that Centerre

62. Id. In CenterreBank even after Centerre Bank called Distributors' loan, bank officers
met with venture capitalists in an attempt to obtain financing for Distributors. Id. When this
effort appeared futile, the bank took possession of Distributors' assets. Id. The bank collected
Distributors' accounts receivable and liquidated Distributors' remaining inventory. Id.
63. Id. at 44.
64. Id. In the collection action that Centerre Bank filed against Distributors in Centerre
Bank, the bank sought to recover from Distributors $227,594.22 due on Distributors' note,
interest of $100,510.04, and collection expenses of $18,537.22. Id. Centerre Bank also filed an
action against the guarantors of Distributors' loan. Id.
65. Id.
66. See id. at 46 (discussing Distributors' claims in Distributors' counterclaim against
Centerre Bank in lower court).
67. See id. at 46-47 (discussing Distributors' claims that loan officers of Centerre Bank
led Distributors' management to believe that Distributors' loan was not in jeopardy of being
called just prior to Centerre Bank's demand). Despite Distributors' claims in Centerre Bank
that Centerre Bank's loan officers had misled Distributors' management concerning the bank's
attitude toward Distributors' loan, Dan Brown, Distributors' General Manager, testified that
on at least two occasions Centerre Bank's loan officers informed Brown that Centerre Bank's
continued financing of Distributors was subject to loan committee approval. Id. at 49-50.
68. Id. at 44. The jury in Centerre Bank determined that Centerre Bank failed to exercise
good faith in calling Distributors' loan. Id. Accordingly, the jury in Centerre Bank awarded
Distributors and the other defendants in the suit a total of $7.528,800 in actual and punitive
damages for fraudulent misrepresentation and nondisclosure. Id. In CenterreBank the Missouri
Court of Appeals remitted half of the $6 million punitive damage award and entered a
$4,528,800 judgment against Centerre Bank on Distributors' counterclaim. Id.
69. Id. In Centerre Bank Distributors appealed the remittitur of the punitive damages.
Id. Because the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the damages judgement against Centerre
Bank, the court no longer needed to decide the validity of the remittitur issue. Id.
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Bank lacked good faith in initiating its collection action against Distribu70
tors.

On appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's
holding that Centerre Bank breached Centerre Bank's duty under section 1203 to perform contractual obligations in good faith. 71 In addressing Dis-

tributors' claim that the U.C.C. imposed upon Centerre Bank a duty to
perform in good faith when Centerre Bank called Distributors' demand

note, the Court of Appeals reasoned that because Centerre Bank included
an unqualified demand provision .in the promissory note that Distributors
signed, the promissory note provided evidence that Centerre Bank and

Distributors had established a relationship in which Centerre Bank retained
unfettered discretion to demand payment of the entire balance of Distrib-

utors' loan.72 After considering the reasoning of the court in Fulton National
Bank, the Missouri Court of Appeals in Centerre Bank determined that
section 1-203's good faith obligation had no application to demand notes
because section 1-203's good faith obligation would add a term to the
73
agreement that the parties did not include in the original agreement.

70. See id. (discussing Centerre Bank's argument that court erred in allowing Distributors
to assert that Centerre Bank lacked good faith in calling note as defense to Centerre Bank's
suit to collect unpaid balance of demand note).
71. See id. (reversing lower court's ruling that Centerre Bank lacked good faith in calling
Distributors' loan).
72. See id. at 48 (discussing significance of provision in loan agreement between Distributors and Centerre Bank).
73. See id. at 47-48 (echoing reasoning of Georgia Court of Appeals in Fulton National
Bank that imposing good faith obligation upon lender's explicit right to demand repayment
would alter agreement between lender and borrower). The court in Centerre Bank expressed
an unwillingness to rewrite the terms of the original loan agreement that the contracting parties
initially negotiated. Id.
After the decisions in Fulton National Bank and Centerre Bank the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas in Taggart & Taggart Seed v. First Tennessee
Bank, 684 F. Supp. 230 (E.D. Ark. 1988), aff'd, 1989 WL 87802 (8th Cir. 1989) examined
whether the U.C.C's covenant of good faith applied to a demand instrument. In Taggart First
Tennessee Bank (First Tennessee) and Taggart & Taggart Seed Co. (Taggart) executed a loan
agreement in which First Tennessee provided Taggart an $18 million secured line of credit.
Id. at 232. Under the terms of the financing agreement that Taggart and First Tennessee
executed, First Tennessee reserved the right to demand payment of the entire outstanding
balance of Taggart's loan. Id. at 235. In addition to reserving the right to demand full payment
of the loan without prior notice to Taggart of First Tennessee's intention to call the loan,
First Tennessee also reserved the right to refuse to advance funds to Taggart without prior
notice to Taggart. Id. In Taggart First Tennessee held as a portion of the collateral for
Taggart's loan United States Department of Agriculture warehouse receipts for grain that
Taggart stored in silos on Taggart's property. Id. at 232. Under the terms of the loan agreement
that Taggart executed with First Tennessee, Taggart could not remove the grain from storage
until First Tennessee received payment from Taggart for the stored grain and released the
warehouse receipts. Id. After discovering that Taggart, without first paying First Tennessee,
had removed from storage a portion of the grain that secured Taggart's loan with First
Tennessee, First Tennessee demanded repayment of the outstanding balance of Taggart's line
of credit with First Tennessee. Id. In response to First Tennessee's demand, Taggart obtained
a replacement line of credit from another lender and honored First Tennessee's demand for
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Not all courts, however, have accepted the rationale of the courts in
Fulton National Bank and Centerre Bank that the good faith requirement

of sections 1-208 and 1-203 does not apply to demand instruments. 74 For
example, in Reid v. Key Bank of Southern Maine the United States Court

of Appeals for the First Circuit considered whether an obligation of good
faith applied to a lender's decision to demand repayment under the terms
of a loan agreement. 75 In Reid, Paul Reid and Depositors Trust Co. of

Southern Maine (Depositors Trust), Key Bank's predecessor in interest,
entered into a financing arrangement in which Depositors Trust provided
to Reid a $25,000 secured line of credit.7 6 The line of credit provided

working capital for Reid's paint subcontracting business. 77 Under the terms
of the financing agreement, Depositors Trust reserved the right to demand

repayment. Id.
In Taggart several months after Taggart honored First Tennessee's demand for repayment
of the outstanding balance of Taggart's line of credit with First Tennessee, Taggart filed an
action against First Tennessee in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Arkansas. Id. In Taggart's action against First Tennessee, Taggart alleged that First Tennessee's
failure to continue a credit relationship with Taggart pursuant to First Tennessee's loan
agreement with Taggart constituted a breach of the covenant of good faith that § 1-208 of
the U.C.C. implied in the loan agreement. Id. In moving for summary judgment, First
Tennessee argued that a borrower may not invoke § 1-208's good faith requirement to block
a lender's unilateral decision to terminate a demand note. Id. The court in Taggart agreed
with First Tennessee that because the loan agreement that governed Taggart's line of credit
with First Tennessee specifically stated that any outstanding balance on the line of credit was
repayable on demand, § 1-208's good faith requirement did not create a genuine issue of
material fact. Id. at 235-36. The district court subsequently granted First Tennessee's motion
for summary judgment. Id. at 239. In ruling in favor of First Tennessee, the Taggart court
relied upon the reasoning of the Georgia Court of Appeals in Fulton National Bank and the
reasoning of the Missouri Court of Appeals in Centerre Bank. Id. at 236. In addition to
relying on the reasoning of the Fulton National Bank court and the Centerre Bank court, the
court in Taggart also relied upon the official comment to § 1-208 of the U.C.C. which states
that § 1-208 obviously does not apply to demand notes because holders of demand notes
reserve the right to call the notes at any time without reason. Id. at 235-36. After noting that
First Tennessee's right to call the loan was a significant element of First Tennessee's credit
relationship with Taggart, the Taggart court further stated that absent clear and convincing
evidence that Taggart presented to demonstrate First Tennessee's fraudulent behavior, the
court would not alter the stated contract terms. Id. at 236.
74. See Reid v. Key Bank of S. Maine, 821 F.2d 9, 12 (Ist Cir. 1987) (holding that
lender, in calling borrower's demand note breached good faith obligation of §§ 1-208 and 1203); K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 760 (6th Cir. 1985) (stating in dicta that
demand clause is type of acceleration clause to which good faith obligation of § 1-208 applies);
infra notes 39-52 and 66-71 and accompanying text (discussing Georgia Court of Appeals' and
Missouri Court of Appeals' rejection of application of § 1-208's good faith obligation to
demand notes in Fulton National Bank and Centerre Bank).
75. 821 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1987).
76. Reid v. Key Bank of S. Maine, 821 F.2d 9, 11 (Ist Cir. 1987). According to the
terms of the loan agreement in Reid, Reid pledged his personal vehicle, a commercial vehicle,'
and the accounts receivable of Reid's painting business as security for the line of credit that
Reid obtained from Depositors Trust. Id.
77. Id. Reid sought the line of credit from Depositors Trust in Reid primarily to finance
one large contract that Reid obtained. Id.
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payment of the entire principal balance of Reid's loan at any time.7 8
According to the financing agreement between Reid and Depositors Trust,
Reid agreed to make quarterly interest payments on the outstanding balance
on the line of credit. 79 When Reid failed to make an interest payment on
the line of credit, Depositors Trust notified Reid of his failure to make the
required quarterly interest payment.80 When Reid failed to respond to
Depositor Trust's communications, Depositors Trust repossessed the vehicles
that secured Reid's loan.8 ' Immediately after Depositors Trust repossessed
Reid's personal automobile and commercial van, Reid's business collapsed
2
forcing Reid to file bankruptcy.
After Reid's painting business collapsed, Reid brought an action against
Depositors Trust in the United States District Court for the District of
Maine. 83 Reid alleged that Depositors Trust acted in bad faith in terminating
the lending arrangement between Reid and Depositors Trust and in demanding payment in full of the outstanding balance on Reid's loan.8 The
jury found that Depositors Trust breached both section 1-203's and section
1-208's covenants of good faith and fair dealing and awarded Reid $100,000
in compensatory damages and $500,000 in exemplary damages. 85 The district
court in Reid struck the jury's award of exemplary damages.8 6 Both Reid
and Depositors Trust appealcd the district court's ruling to the United States
87
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
On appeal, the First Circuit in Reid affirmed the district court's holding
that Depositors Trust breached both section 1-203's general obligation of
good faith and fair dealing and section 1-208's specific requirement that a

78. See id. at 13 (noting that "Secured Interest Note" that Reid executed contained
unambiguous demand clause).
79. Id.

80. Id. at 1i. In Reid when Reid failed to make the September 5, 1979, interest payment
that the loan agreement between Reid and Depositors Trust required, Depositors Trust sent
Reid a past-due notice. Id. Depositors Trust sent the past-due notice to Reid on September
20, 1979. Id.
81. Id. After Depositors Trust repossessed Reid's personal and commercial vehicle in
Reid, Reid discovered one of the repossessed vehicles in a parking lot and attempted to retrieve
the vehicle. Id. The police arrested Reid for Reid's attempted retrieval of the repossessed
vehicle. Id. Reid later testified that he was unaware that Depositors Trust had repossessed the
vehicle and thought that someone had stolen the vehicle. Id.
82. Id. In Reid when Reid's business failed Reid lost four vehicles and his home. Id.
83. See id. at 10 (discussing Reid's action in United States District Court for the District
of Maine in Reid).
84. Id. In Reid in addition to alleging that Depositors Trust demanded repayment in
bad faith, Reid alleged that Depositors Trust interfered with Reid's contractual relationships
with other parties and wrongfully dishonored Reid's checks. Id. at 12. Reid further alleged
that racial prejudice motivated Depositors Trust's bad faith toward Reid. Id. at 11.
85. See id. at 12 (discussing jury's award of damages to Reid due to Depositors Trust's
breach of obligation of good faith).
86. See id. (noting that District Court of Maine struck exemplary damages). In Reid the
First Circuit stated that Depositors Trust's breach of obligation of good faith was not a tort
for which Maine law provided exemplary damages. Id. at 16.
87. Id. at 11.
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lender exercise good faith when accelerating a borrower's debt.88 The First
Circuit found that evidence of Depositors Trust's failure to take account

of Reid's financial problems by negotiating an alternative solution to calling
Reid's loan supported the jury's finding that Depositors Trust's treatment
of Reid lacked good faith. s9 Depositors Trust, however, argued that section
1-208 applied only to acceleration clauses. 90 Depositors Trust further argued
that financing agreements that contain demand clauses preclude courts from

finding that the lenders in the agreements owe the borrowers a duty of
good faith when the lenders demand repayment of the notes. 91 Depositors
Trust argued that the good faith provisions of the U.C.C. do not apply to

demand notes because applying the good faith obligation to a demand
provision would alter the nature of the original agreement. 92 In response to
Depositors Trust's argument that the U.C.C.'s good faith obligations did
not apply to the demand note that Reid and Depositors Trust had executed,

the First Circuit in Reid held that Depositors Trust maintained only a
qualified right to enforce the demand provision of the note because a

separate document relating to the security interest that Depositors Trust
maintained in collateral as security for the line of credit between Reid and
Depositors Trust mentioned the event of default. 9 The First Circuit found
that the separate document mentioning the event of default prevented the

demand clause in the loan agreement from being an unequivocal demand
provision, and, therefore, held that the financing agreement between Reid

and Depositors Trust did not constitute a demand note. 94 Accordingly, the
First Circuit in Reid held that section 1-208's covenant of good faith and

88. See id. at 13 (stating that lower court in Reid correctly applied good faith obligation
of §§ 1-203 and 1-208 to loan agreement between Reid and Depositors Trust).
89. See id. at 15 (stating that Depositors Trust did not make a good faith effort to find
solution to problems that Depositors Trust perceived in Depositors Trust's relationship with
Reid). On appeal the First Circuit in Reid also held that Depositors Trust's failure to give
Reid sufficient notice that Depositors Trust intended to terminate the credit relationship
between Reid and Depositors Trust evidenced Depositors Trust's bad faith in dealing with
Reid. Id.
90. Id. at 13.
91. See id. (discussing Depositors Trust's argument against applying good faith obligation
to demand notes). In Reid Depositors Trust contended that § 1-208 of the U.C.C. and the
official comment to § 1-208 precluded the application of the U.C.C.'s good faith requirement
to demand notes. Id.
92. Id.
93. See id. at 14 (reasoning that Depositors Trusts qualified right to demand repayment
of Reid's loan warranted placing Depositors Trust under good faith obligation). After the
court in Reid acknowledged that the demand note that Reid executed in favor of Depositors
Trust contained an unambiguous demand clause, the First Circuit cited events constituting
default in the security agreement as limitations upon Depositors Trust's right to demand
repayment. Id.
94. Id. The First Circuit in Reid held that despite Reid's acceptance of the demand
language found in the demand note, because the security agreement contained default provisions, Depositors Trust did not retain an unqualified right to demand repayment. Id.
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fair dealing applied to Depositors Trust's demand of repayment in full of
95
Reid's debt.
In addition to focusing upon a lender's discretionary right to call a
demand note, courts also have examined a lender's discretionary right to
96
refuse to advance funds to a borrower against the borrower's line of credit.
Although the loan agreements that govern demand notes specifically state
that the lender may refuse at the lender's discretion to advance funds to a
borrower against the borrower's line of credit, courts have applied section
1-203's good faith obligation to limit a lender's discretionary right to refuse
97
to advance funds against a borrower's line of credit.
In K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 98 for example, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit considered whether section 1-203's

requirement that parties to a contract must perform in good faith limited
a lender's right to advance funds against a borrower's line of credit at will

and without prior notice to the borrower. 99 In K.M.C. Irving Trust and
K.M.C. Co. entered into a financing agreement in which Irving .Trust
provided K.M.C. a $3.5 million secured line of credit. 100 The line of credit
provided operating capital for K.M.C.'s wholesale and retail grocery business.' 0' Under the terms of the financing agreement, Irving Trust reserved

the right to demand payment of the entire principal amount outstanding on
K.M.C.'s credit line at any time without prior notice to K.M.C.'02 In
addition to reserving the right to demand full payment of the loan without
prior notice, Irving Trust also reserved the right to refuse without prior
notice to advance funds to K.M.C. 0

3

Three years after K.M.C. and Irving

Trust entered into the loan agreement, K.M.C.'s financial condition deteriorated and, consequently, Irving Trust refused to advance $800,000 to
K.M.C.'0 Because K.M.C. lacked sufficient funds to continue to operate

95. Id.

96. See supra notes 28-93 and accompanying text (discussing courts' focus upon lenders'
right to call demand notes); see infra notes 96-114 and accompanying text (discussing courts'
focus upon lenders' right to refuse to advance funds against borrowers' line of credit).
97. See K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 1985) (relying on
§ 2-309 of U.C.C. to alter express contract provision that allowed lender to deny borrower's
requests for advances against borrower's line of credit without prior notice to borrower).
98. 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985).
99. K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 760 (6th Cir. 1985).
100. Id. at 754. In K.M.C. Irving Trust held a security interest in K.M.C.'s accounts
receivable and inventory as collateral for the line of credit that Irving Trust extended to
K.M.C. Id. Under the terms of the financing agreement, K.M.C.'s customers remitted accounts
receivable payments directly to a "blocked account" that Irving Trust controlled. Id. at 759.
Irving Trust based the advances that Irving Trust made to K.M.C. against K.M.C.'s line of
credit upon the amount of K.M.C.'s receivables outstanding and the level of K.M.C.'s inventory
on hand. Id.
101. Id. at 754.

102. Id. at 759-60.
103. Id. at 759.
104. Id.at 754. In K.M.C. in March 1982, Irving Trust refused to advance $800,000
against K.M.C.'s line of credit as K.M.C. requested. Id.Irving Trust denied K.M.C.'s request
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its wholesale and retail grocery business, K.M.C. discontinued operations. 0 5

After discontinuing operations, K.M.C. maintained an action against
Irving Trust in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Tennessee.101 K.M.C. alleged that in refusing to advance funds to K.M.C.
without prior notice to K.M.C., Irving Trust breached its duty to perform

in good faith under section 1-203 and that Irving Trust's breach forced
K.M.C. out of business.' 7 In addition to alleging that Irving Trust breached
its duty of good faith by refusing to advance funds to K.M.C., K.M.C.
further alleged that although Irving Trust had not yet exercised Irving
Trust's right to call K.M.C.'s line of credit, section 1-208 would require
Irving Trust to exercise good faith if Irving Trust demanded repayment of

K.M.C.'s loan under the provisions of the financing agreement. 108In K.M.C.
the jury found that Irving Trust breached the duty of good faith that
section 1-203 implied in the contract between K.M.C. and Irving Trust and

awarded K.M.C. $7.5 million in damages.'0 9 Irving Trust appealed the lower

court's decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth

Circuit. 10
On appeal; the Sixth Circuit in K.M.C. affirmed the district court's

holding that Irving Trust breached the duty of good faith performance that

section 1-203 implied in the loan agreement between K.M.C. and Irving
Trust."' The Sixth Circuit determined that the Magistrate correctly instructed

because the loan officer who was responsible for K.M.C.'s loan believed that K.M.C. was
relying too heavily on short term unsecured credit from suppliers and that K.M.C.'s financial
condition was deteriorating. Id. at 762. If granted, the $800,000 advance that K.M.C. requested
would have increased K.M.C.'s loan balance to just under the $3.5 million limit. Id. at 754.
105. Id. at 754. As a result of Irving Trust's refusal to advance funds to K.M.C., the
bank dishonored checks that K.M.C. had sent to suppliers because K.M.C.'s account did not
contain sufficient funds to cover all of K.M.C.'s outstanding checks. Id. at 759. After
unsuccessfully attempting to secure another source of financing, K.M.C. discontinued operations. Id.
106. See id. at 754 (discussing K.M.C's action against Irving Trust in United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, in which K.M.C. alleged that Irving Trust breached
its obligation of good faith in refusing to advance funds against K.M.C.'s line of credit).
107. See id. at 754 (discussing K.M.C.'s allegations that Irving Trust, in refusing to
advance funds against K.M.C.'s line of credit, breached § 1-203's good faith obligation). In
K.M.C.'s action against Irving Trust, K.M.C. alleged that by refusing to advance funds to
K.M.C. without notice, Irving Trust destroyed K.M.C.'s business. Id. In K.M.C.'s complaint,
K.M.C. requested $12 million in compensatory damages and $25 million in punitive damages.
Plaintiff's Complaint, K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., No. CIV-3-82-365, at 8.
108. See id. at 760 (noting K.M.C.'s additional allegation that Irving Trust breached § I208's obligation of good faith in demanding full repayment of K.M.C.'s line of credit).
109. Id. at 755. In K.M.C. the jury awarded K.M.C. $7.5 million plus interest, relying
upon expert testimony regarding the damage to K.M.C.'s business that resulted from Irving
Trust's breach of contract. Id. at 763-66.
110. Id. at 754.
I11. See id. at 758-59 (stating that district court correctly held that § 1-203's good faith
obligation imposed upon lender duty to give notice to borrower before lender could refuse to
advance funds against borrower's line of credit).
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the jury that Irving Trust owed K.M.C. an obligation to act in good faith." 2

In K.M.C. the Sixth Circuit stated that by requiring a lender to give notice
to a borrower before refusing to advance funds on the borrower's line of
credit, section 2-309 of the U.C.C. specifically defines the lender's obligation
of good faith in situations in which the lender unilaterally terminates a line

of credit." 3 Moreover, the Sixth Circuit in K.M.C. concluded that because
the duty of good faith that the U.C.C. implies in every contract governed
the financing agreement between K.M.C. and Irving Trust, absent a valid

business reason for not giving notice to K.M.C., the good faith notice
provision of section 2-309 required that Irving Trust provide notice to
K.M.C. before Irving Trust refused to advance funds against K.M.C.'s line

of credit." 4 In reaching its decision in K.M.C., the Sixth Circuit reasoned
that without providing sufficient notice of Irving Trust's decision to terminate K.M.C.'s line of credit, Irving Trust left K.M.C. without sufficient
operating capital to survive until K.M.C. could obtain an alternative source
of financing which ultimately caused K.M.C. to discontinue operating

K.M.C.'s wholesale and retail grocery business."

5

In addition to determining that Irving Trust could not terminate K.M.C's

line of credit without prior notice to K.M.C., the Sixth Circuit in K.M.C.
considered whether section 1-208's good faith obligation limited Irving

Trust's contractual right to demand repayment of the entire balance of
K.M.C.'s line of credit."

6

In response to Irving Trust's objection that the

112. See id. at 759 (recounting Magistrate's instructions to jury that Irving Trust had
duty to notify K.M.C. prior to refusing to advance funds against K.M.C.'s line of credit). In
K.M.C. the Magistrate had instructed the jury that the U.C.C. implied an obligation of good
faith into every contract. Id. The Magistrate further instructed the jury that in accordance
with this obligation of good faith, Irving Trust had a duty to give K.M.C. notice before
refusing to advance funds against K.M.C.'s line of credit. Id.
113. See id. (stating that § 2-309 infers that party terminating contract must provide other
party to contract prior notice of intention to terminate prior to party's unilateral termination
of contract). In K.M.C. the court applied § 2-309 of the U.C.C. to the termination provision
in the loan agreement between K.M.C. and Irving Trust. Id; see also U.C.C. § 2-309 (1987)
(stating that U.C.C. will infer in contracts that fail to address notice prior to termination a
reasonable notice requirement prior to termination).
114. See id. at 759 (discussing Sixth Circuit's conclusion that § 2-309 imposed upon Irving
Trust good faith obligation to provide K.M.C. notice prior to Irving Trust's termination of
lending relationship with K.M.C.). Although the court in K.M.C. did not specify what would
constitute a valid business reason for withholding notice, the Sixth Circuit noted that the loan
officer's belief that K.M.C. had such a severe cash flow problem that the bank could not
honor all of K.M.C.'s outstanding checks upon presentment to K.M.C.'s bank even if K.M.C.
received the advance that K.M.C. requested was not a sufficiently valid reason to justify Irving
Trust's action. Id.
115. See id. (reasoning that Irving Trust's refusal to advance funds to K.M.C. without
prior notice would leave K.M.C. without sufficient financial resources to continue operating).
After noting that a medium sized grocer like K.M.C. could not operate without outside
financing, the court in K.M.C. concluded that Irving Trust's denial of K.M.C.'s request for
operating funds coupled with Irving Trust's control of K.M.C.'s incoming receivables placed
K.M.C. in an impossible situation. Id.
116. See id. at 760 (applying § 1-208's good faith obligation to demand note that K.M.C.
and Irving Trust executed in K.M.C.).
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granted Fulton National Bank's motion for summary judgment, the Fulton
National Bank court reasoned that Fulton National Bank's good faith or
lack of good faith in terminating the floor plan agreement between WDF
and the bank did not present to the court a genuine issue of material fact.4 6
In reaching this decision, the Georgia Court of Appeals reasoned that
section 1-208's good faith obligation did not apply to the demand notes
that governed the relationship between the bank and WDF because the very
nature of a demand note permits the holder of the demand note to call the
borrower's obligation at any time. 47 After acknowledging that demand notes
are by nature immediately payable, the court in Fulton National Bank
concluded that imposing a good faith obligation upon the lender would
alter the nature of the original loan agreement between the lender and the
48
borrower.
In addition to refusing to apply section 1-208 to the demand provision
of the note, the Fulton National Bank court also rejected WDF's claim that
the obligation of good faith in section 1-203 imposes a general obligation
on lenders to act in good faith in all credit transactions. 49 In rejecting
WDF's claim that section 1-203's good faith obligation applies to lenders
in all credit transactions, the Georgia Court of Appeals reasoned that section
1-203 extends the duty to act in good faith only to obligations that a
contract does not address directly.50 The court refused to apply section 1203 to the loan agreement between Fulton National Bank and WDF because
specific contract terms regulated Fulton National Bank's right to demand
repayment of WDF's loan.51 The court further acknowledged that section
3-122 of Georgia's Commercial Code states that the sole duty of a holder
of a demand instrument is to seek repayment of the borrower's obligation
within the applicable statute of limitations.5 2 Because Fulton National Bank
exercised the right to demand repayment within the applicable statute of
limitations, the court held that WDF successfully could not assert that

46. See id. at 848-49, 269 S.E.2d at 919 (reasoning that § 1-208's good faith obligation
did not apply to the demand notes because nature of demand note permits holder of demand
note to call borrower's obligation at any time).

47. See id. (finding that § 1-208 of U.C.C. does not apply to demand notes).
48. See id. (concluding that § 1-208's good faith obligation does not apply to demand
notes).
49. See id. (rejecting argument that § 1-203's good faith obligation limits lender's
contractual right to demand repayment). In Fulton National Bank the Georgia Court of
Appeals noted that WDF failed to consider that a demand note is immediately due without
prior notice or demand by the lender. Id.
50. See id. (refusing to apply § 1-203 to obligations that loan agreement between Fulton
National Bank and WDF directly addressed).

51. See id. (refusing to apply § 1-203 to loan agreement between Fulton National Bank
and WDF because specific terms of contract granted .Fulton National Bank right to demand
repayment of WDF's loan).
52. See id. (discussing duties of holders of demand notes under Georgia's Commercial
Code); see also Ga. Code Ann. § 109A-3-122(l)(b) (stating that sole duty of holder of demand

note is to initiate action to collect debt that borrower owed to holder of note within applicable
statute of limitations period).
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Fulton National Bank acted in bad faith in calling WDF's loan.53 Finally,
the court in Fulton National Bank determined that applying an obligation
of good faith to the demand provision in the contract between WDF and

Fulton National Bank would require Fulton National Bank to surrender a
5 4
right that the bank had acquired as a result of free and fair bargaining.
5
Similarly, in Centerre Bank v. Distributors, Inc. the Missouri Court
of Appeals for the Western District of Missouri considered whether section
1-208 applied to a lender's right to call a demand note.56 In Centerre Bank
Distributors, Inc. (Distributors) and Centerre Bank executed a financing

agreement in 1979 in which Centerre Bank provided Distributors a $900,000
line of credit. 7 The line of credit provided operating capital for Distributors,
which was a supplier of kitchen appliances to builders in the Kansas City
area.58 The terms of the financing agreement that Distributors and Centerre

Bank executed required that Distributors sign a promissory note payable to
Centerre Bank upon Centerre Bank's demand. 59 Because of a depression in

the building industry in 1979 and 1980, Distributors' financial condition
deteriorated

°

In August 1981 Centerre Bank notified Distributors that

Centerre Bank intended to discontinue Centerre Bank's credit relationship
with Distributors. 6' Because Distributors was unable to secure an alternative

53. Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Willis Denney Ford, 154 Ga. App. 846, 847, 269 S.E.2d 916,
918 (Ct. App. 1980). The court in Fulton National Bank concluded that WDF had no basis
to contest the bank's decision to demand repayment if the bank demanded repayment within
the period of time that the statute of limitations allowed for demand of repayment because
the contract specifically granted Fulton National Bank the right to demand repayment at any
time. Id.
54. Id. In Fulton National Bank the Georgia Court of Appeals stated that WDF's
signature on the demand note evidenced WDF's acceptance of the demand provision. Id. The
court in Fulton NationalBank further stated that because WDF freely signed the note containing
a clause that gave Fulton National Bank an unqualified right to demand repayment of WDF's
loan, WDF had no ground to contest Fulton National Bank's decision to call WDF's note.
Id.

55. 705 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
56. Centerre Bank v. Distributors, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 42, 46 (Mo. App. 1985).
57. Id. at 44.
58. Id.

59. Id. In Centerre Bank the bank loan agreement between Centerre Bank and Distributors provided that Distributors would pledge all of Distributors' accounts receivable and
inventory to secure the $900,000 line of credit. Id.
60. Id. at 45. In Centerre Bank Distributors' 1979 financial statement indicated a loss
in excess of $100,000. Id. Upon receipt of Distributors' 1979 financial statement, Centerre
Bank placed Distributors' loan on Centerre Bank's problem loan list. Id. This action by
Centerre Bank indicated that Centerre Bank considered Distributors' loan to have a high
probability of loss. See id. (discussing Distributors' financial condition prior to Centerre Bank's
decision to call Distributors' loan).
61. Id. In addition to the weakening financial condition of Distributors in Centerre
Bank, Centerre Bank was also concerned about the deterioration of Centerre Bank's collateral
for the loan. Id. Because of the depressed state of the building industry, Centerre Bank
conservatively deemed at least 14 percent of Distributors' receivables uncollectible at the time
that Centerre Bank terminated Distributors' line of credit. Id. at 46. In addition, Centerre
Bank was concerned that Distributors' inventory estimates were inaccurate. Id.
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section 1-208, the commentators to the U.C.C. recognized the incongruity
between section 1-208's good faith requirement and a lender's right under
the terms of a typical demand note to demand repayment in full at any
time.' Because the lender's express unqualified contractual right to call a
demand note conflicts with section 1-208's requirement that a lender accelerate payment of the balance of a note only if the lender has a good faith
belief that circumstances have impaired the borrower's ability to pay or
perform, the commentators to the U.C.C. concluded that the good faith
requirement of section 1-208 did not apply to demand notes.1 2 In reaching
this conclusion, commentators to the U.C.C. noted that the nature of
demand notes allows the holder of the demand instrument the unfettered
33
right to demand repayment at any time.
Lastly, although section 1-102(3) of the U.C.C. prohibits contracting
parties from totally disclaiming the good faith obligation in a contractual
relationship, section 1-102(3) allows the parties to a contract to define a
reasonable standard of good faith that will govern the relationship between
the contracting parties. 34 By negotiating repayment terms in which the
lender acquires the unfettered right to demand repayment of the entire debt
at any time in exchange for a flexible schedule that allows the borrower to
defer all principal payments, the parties to a demand note in fact have
defined the standard of good faith that will govern repayment of the

borrower's debt. 3 5 Because the courts in Fulton NationalBank and Centerre
Bank recognized that the U.C.C. allows contracting parties the freedom to

specify the required standard of good faith performance in commercial
transactions, courts correctly refused to apply the good faith requirement
36

of section 1-208 to override the express terms of the demand notes.

131. U.C.C. § 1-208 comment (1987). The comment to U.C.C. § 1-208 states that
"obviously this section has no application to demand instruments or obligations whose very
nature permits call at any time with or without any reason. This section applies only to an
agreement or to paper which in the first instance is payable at a future date." Id.
132. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (noting that U.C.C. commentators
recognized incongruity between § 1-208's good faith obligation and lender's express right to
demand repayment in full from borrower).
133. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (stating that U.C.C. commentators
recognized that demand note grants lender right to demand repayment in full from borrower
without regard to lender's motive); supra note 127 and accompanying text (discussing lender's
right to demand repayment from borrower at any time without regard to lender's motive in
demanding repayment).
134. See supra notes 13 and 123 and accompanying text (stating that contracting parties
expressly may establish reasonable standard of good faith that will govern contractual relationship between parties).
135. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (stating that because parties to loan
agreement freely negotiated terms of loan agreement, borrower has no ground on which to
contest lender's decision to exercise lender's contractual right to call loan); supra notes 13,
123-24 and accompanying text (citing Georgia Court of Appeals' conclusion in Fulton National
Bank v. Willis Denney Ford, Inc. that WDF's signature on demand note evidenced WDF's
acceptance of contract terms).
136. See Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Willis Denney Ford, Inc., 154 Ga. App. 846, 847, 269
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In Reid, however, the First Circuit failed to recognize the incongruity
between the good faith standard of section 1-208 and the express terms of

a demand note. 3 7 The court in Reid stated that a literal construction of the
demand provision that the loan agreement between Reid and Depositors
Trust contained would grant Depositors Trust an immediate right to demand
repayment of the full amount of the outstanding debt even if Reid had not
yet received loan funds from Depositors Trust. 38 To avoid recognizing
Depositors Trust's unqualified right to demand repayment of Reid's loan

at any time, the Reid court relied on the use of the term "default" in a
separate document as evidence that Depositors Trust could demand repay-

ment only upon Reid's default. 3 9 Because the court in Reid held that the
demand provision was not an integrated part of the loan agreement between
Reid and Depositors Trust, the court concluded that the note that governed
Reid's credit relationship with Depositors Trust was not a demand note.'1 °
After concluding that Depositors Trust could exercise its right to demand
repayment only upon Reid's default, the First Circuit in Reid reasoned that
the drafters of the U.C.C. did not intend to exclude loan agreements like
Reid's from the coverage of section 1-208. The court in Reid, therefore,
applied section 1-208's obligation of good faith to alter the express terms
of the written contract between Reid and Depositors Trust. 4' In applying

1-208 to the loan agreement in Reid, the First Circuit focused on a
contractual technicality that produced a different result than either Reid or
Depositors Trust had intended when they drafted the contract that would
govern their loan relationship. 42 Rather than indicating that Depositors
S.E.2d 916, 918 (Ct. App. 1980) (holding that § 1-208's good faith obligation does not alter
lender's contractual right to demand full repayment of borrower's debt that was payable upon
demand); Centerre Bank v. Distributors, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 42, 48 (Mo. App. 1985) (holding
that § 1-203's good faith obligation does not alter lender's contractual right to demand full
repayment of borrower's debt that was payable upon demand).
137. See infra notes 137-41 and accompanying text (discussing First Circuit's application
in Reid v. Key Bank of S. Maine of § 1-208's good faith obligation to note containing demand
clause); see also supra notes 87-93 (discussing First Circuit's reasoning in applying § 1-208's
good faith obligation in Reid).
138. See Reid v. Key Bank of S. Maine, 821 F.2d 9, 13-14 (1st Cir. 1987) (stating that
because Reid had not yet received loan funds from Depositors Trust, demand clause note
representing line of credit could not be evidence of lender's unqualified right to demand
repayment).
139. See id. (holding that despite Reid's unqualified execution of demand note, because
security agreement securing collateral for loan contained default provisions, Depositors Trust
did not retain an unqualified right to demand repayment).
140. See id. at 14. (stating that qualified nature of demand clause prevented court from
construing loan agreement as demand note).
141. See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text (discussing First Circuit's application
of § 1-208's good faith obligation to note containing demand clause in Reid); infra notes 14451 and accompanying text (discussing Sixth Circuit's application of § 2-309's good faith notice
requirement to limit lender's contractual right to refuse to advance funds against borrower's
line of credit in K.M.C.).
142. See Reid v. Key Bank of S. Maine, 821 F.2d at 14 (reasoning that because of
ambiguity in loan documents Depositors Trust was required to comply with obligation of good
faith in § 1-208).
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Trust would have a qualified right to demand repayment of the outstanding
balance on Reid's loan, the language of the demand provision in Reid's
loan agreement, like other demand provisions in similar cases, indicated
that Depositors Trust would have an unfettered right to call Reid's loan at
4
any time.
In addition to incorrectly altering the terms of express demand notes
to apply section 1-208's good faith obligation to require a lender to exercise
good faith when the lender calls a demand note, similarly courts incorrectly
have applied section 2-309 and section 1-203 to a lender's decision to refuse
to advance funds against a borrower's line of credit without prior notice to
the borrower of the lender's decision to terminate the line of credit.' 44
Contrary to the U.C.C.'s goal of facilitating commerce by allowing parties
to set forth in the express terms of a contract the standard of good faith
that will govern the contractual relationship, the Sixth Circuit in K.M.C.
applied the good faith requirement of section 2-309(3) to restrict Irving
Trust's express contractual right to terminate the financing agreement between Irving Trust and K.M.C. at Irving Trust's discretion. 4 Section 2309(3) of the U.C.C. requires that a party to a contract who wishes to
terminate the contract give the other party to the contract reasonable notice
146
of the terminating party's decision unilaterally to terminate the contract.
In K.M.C. the Sixth Circuit stated that section 2-309 imposes upon a lender
a good faith obligation to give the borrower notice before the lender refuses
to advance funds against a discretionary line of credit.147 In K.M.C.,
however, Irving Trust reserved the express contractual right to deny advances
against the line of credit at Irving Trust's discretion. 48 Without regard to
the U.C.C.'s deference to the express terms of a contract, the Sixth Circuit
in K.M.C. allowed the good faith obligation of section 2-309(3) to override
the express terms of the lending agreement between K.M.C. and Irving
Trust. 49 Furthermore, section 2-309(3) typically applies to the termination

143. Id.
144. See K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 1985) (applying §
2-309's good faith notice requirement to limit lender's contractual right to refuse to advance

funds against borrower's line of credit in K.M.C.).
145. See id. (applying § 2-309's good faith notice requirement to alter Irving Trust's
express contractual right to refuse to advance funds against K.M.C.'s line of credit); supra
notes 13 and 123 and accompanying text (discussing § 1-102(3) of U.C.C. which allows
contracting parties to define reasonable standards of good faith to govern contractual rela-

tionships).
146. See U.C.C. § 2-309(3) (1987) (requiring that parties who terminate contract give
other party to contract prior notice of unilateral termination of contract).
147. See K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 1985) (applying §
2-309's notice requirement to limit lender's contractual right to refuse to advance funds against

borrower's line of credit in K.M.C.).
148. See id. (holding that Irving Trust breached obligation of good faith to K.M.C. by
denying K.M.C.'s request for funds without prior notice to K.M.C. of Irving Trust's termination of K.M.C.'s right to advances against K.M.C. line of credit).
149. See id. (applying § 2-309's notice requirement to limit Irving Trust's contractual right
to refuse to advance funds against K.M.C.'s line of credit).
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of employment contracts, supply contracts, or distributorship contracts. 150
In contrast, most courts have held that Article 2 of the U.C.C. does not
apply to nonsales contracts.' 51 In K.M.C., however, the Sixth Circuit applied
section 2-309(3)'s notice requirement to a lender's refusal to advance funds
on a borrower's discretionary line of credit. 152 Because the contract between
K.M.C. and Irving Trust was a nonsales contract, the Sixth Circuit in
K.M.C. inappropriately imputed section 2-309(3)'s good faith notice require53
ment to the lending relationship.
In both Reid and K.M.C. the First Circuit and the Sixth Circuit arguably
interpreted demand notes in a fair manner that protected borrowers from
lenders' exercise of the lenders' discretionary rights. 54 Both the Reid court
and the K.M.C. court, however, failed to acknowledge that the borrowers
in Reid and K.M.C. were active participants in the arms-length negotiations
that produced the loan agreements. 55 By signing the loan agreements, the
borrowers in K.M.C. and Reid acknowledged and agreed to the conditions
that the loan agreements contained. 156 Because each of the loan agreements
was the product of free arms-length negotiations between two commercial

150. See, e.g., Zidell Explorations, Inc. v. Conval Int'l, 719 F.2d 1465, 1473 (9th Cir.
1983) (applying § 2-309's notice requirement to party's right to terminate distributorship
contract); Corenswet, Inc. V. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 594 F.2d 129, 137 (5th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 938 (1979) (applying § 2-309's notice requirement to party's right to
terminate exclusive distributorship contract); deTreville v. Outboard Marine Corp., 439 F.2d
1099, 1100 (4th Cir. 1971) (applying § 2-309's notice requirement to party's right to terminate
franchise agreement).
151. See Van Bibber v. Norris, 419 N.E.2d 115, 122 (Ind. 1981) (stating that because
lender does not satisfy U.C.C. definition of merchant, lender need meet additional obligation
of good faith that U.C.C. imposes upon merchants); Sievert v. First Nat'l Bank, 358 N.W.2d
409, 414 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (stating that commercially reasonable standard of good faith
in Article 2 of U.C.C. does not apply to lender's conduct in negotiating refinancing of loan
agreement with borrower); Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen's Bank & Trust Co. 713 S.W.2d 517, 526
(Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that in relationship between lender and borrower, obligation of
good faith is limited to honesty in fact standard of U.C.C.); but see K.M.C. Co. v. Irving
Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 1985) (relying on § 2-309 of U.C.C. to alter express
contract terms that allowed lender to terminate borrower's line of credit without prior notice
to borrower).
152. See K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 1985) (applying §
2-309's notice requirement to limit lender's contractual right to refuse to advance funds against
borrower's line of credit in K.M.C.).
153. See id. at 759 (holding that § 2-309's good faith notice requirement to limited Irving
Trust's contractual right to refuse to advance funds against K.M.C.'s line of credit).
154. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text (discussing First Circuit's interpretation
of demand note in Reid); supra notes 115-116 (discussing Sixth Circuit's interpretation of
demand note in K.M.C.).
155. See supra notes 87-96 and accompanying text (discussing First Circuit's analysis of
loan agreement in Reid); supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text (discussing First Circuit's
analysis of loan agreement in K.M.C.). K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 759
(6th Cir. 1985). In fact, in K.M.C. the court noted that in the absence of the good faith
obligation, K.M.C. would be entirely at Irving Trust's mercy. Id.
156. See supra note 154 and accompanying text (discussing courts' analysis of loan
negotiation and ultimate loan agreement in Reid and K.M.C.).
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parties, the K.M.C. court and the Reid court should not have imposed
upon the lenders in K.M.C. and Reid a good faith obligation to shield
borrowers from lenders' use of contractual discretionary rights in a manner
157
that the borrower had not contemplated.
Because of the riskiness of lending to small and medium-sized businesses,
lenders generally strive to retain as much discretion as possible in the lenderborrower relationship."' For example, when contracting with small and
medium-sized businesses, a lender often reserves the right to demand full
repayment of the loan or refuse to advance funds against the borrower's
line of credit at the lender's discretion so that the lender can minimize
potential loan losses in the event that the borrower's financial condition
deteriorates. 5 9 Because small and medium-sized business owners realize that
the success of their business ventures depends on the business owner's ability
to obtain low-cost financing with flexible repayment terms, small and
medium-sized business owners willingly grant lenders certain discretionary
rights. 16° By including discretionary terms in the loan agreement, the parties
allocate the rights under the loan agreement in a manner that satisfies both
parties.' 6 ' Discretionary lending, therefore, is an important source of financing for small and medium-sized businesses because by reducing the
risks of the transaction to an acceptable level for both parties, discretionary
lending encourages lenders to provide the type of flexible financing that
62
small and medium-sized businesses need.
To preserve the viability of discretionary lending in light of recent court
decisions like K.M.C. and Reid that have limited the lender's exercise of
discretion, lenders must reevaluate their lending practices to ensure that
courts will not apply the U.C.C.'s good faith provisions to alter the express
terms of contracts between lenders and borrowers. 62 Specifically, lenders
must evaluate loan documents to ensure that these documents clearly,
completely, and unequivocally represent the specific terms of the lenderborrower relationship.164 By drafting loan agreements that contain clear and
specific statements of the contracting parties' rights and responsibilities, a

157. See supra notes 153-155 and accompanying text (discussing First Circuit and Sixth
Circuit's improper alteration of discretionary lending agreement in Reid and K.M.C.).
158. See Reisman, The Challenge of the ProposedBankruptcy Act to Accounts Receivable
and Inventory Financing of Small to Medium-Sized Business, 83 CoM.L.J. 169, 211 (1978)
(discussing use of discretionary terms in asset-based lending agreements to preserve discretionary
lending as viable financing option for lenders to small and medium-sized businesses in light
of proposed changes in Bankruptcy Code).

159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See supra notes 157-160 and accompanying text (discussing importance of discretion-

ary lending to small and medium sized businesses).
163. See Note, K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co.: DiscretionaryFinancing and the Implied
Duty of Good Faith, 81 Nw. U.L. REv. 539, 569 (cautioning lenders to enumerate clearly
lenders' discretionary rights in loan agreements).

164. 1d.
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lender can demonstrate that the parties specifically have defined a mutually
acceptable standard of good faith performance that will govern the parties'

actions under the contract. 65 For example, in Reid the court focused upon
the use of the term "default" in a document related to the loan agreement

to qualify the right of a lender holding an unambiguous demand note.'6
To preserve the lender's right to demand repayment of the outstanding loan
balance, therefore, the lender in Reid should have included provisions in

the loan agreement and all related documents that stated unequivocally that
prior notice to
the loan was payable on demand at any time and without
67

the borrower that the lender intended to call the loan.
By specifically and consistently stating in the loan agreement and related
documents that the lender retained an unconditional right to demand repayment, the lender in Reid would have removed any ambiguity that the

court might have used to construe the demand clause as an acceleration
clause. 61 In addition, the clear and unequivocal nature of the demand
provision would have served as evidence that the contracting parties clearly
agreed to include this term in the loan agreement. 6 9

Similarly, by including unequivocal contract terms that will govern the
lender's right to refuse to advance funds against a borrower's line of credit,

a lender can prevent a borrower from asserting, as the borrower did in
K.M.C., that the lender breached an implied duty of good faith. 7 0° The

lender should provide in the loan agreement that in the absence of a valid
business reason for withholding notice to the borrower, the lender will give
the borrower reasonable prior notice of the lender's decision to terminate
the borrower's line of credit. 7 1 Although the exact length of a reasonable

notice period will vary with each type of loan and borrower, the lender
should include in each loan agreement a notice period that is objectively

165. See id. (stating that clearly stated loan agreements provide evidence to courts that
lender and borrower agreed to specific standards of performance).
166. See Reid v. Key Bank of S. Maine, 821 F.2d 9, 13-14 (1st Cir. 1987) (stating that
default provision in security agreement qualified Depositors Trust's right to demand repayment
from Reid); see supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text (discussing First Circuit's interpretation of demand note in Reid).
167. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text (discussing necessity for clear language
in loan agreements to preserve lender's rights).
168. See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text (discussing methods by which lender
can reduce possibility that courts will limit lender's unqualified right to demand repayment).
169. See supra note 162 and accompanying text (stating necessity that language of loan
agreement clearly establish essence of agreement between parties).
170. See infra notes 170-73 and accompanying text (discussing methods by which lender
can reduce possibility that courts will construe lender's refusal to advance funds against line
of credit without prior notice as breach of good faith obligation).
171. See K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 762-63 (6th Cir. 1985) (discussing
provision of loan agreement between K.M.C. and Irving Trust that allowed Irving Trust to
refuse to advance funds to K.M.C. against K.M.C.'s line of credit without prior notice). In
KM.C., the Sixth Circuit stated that if the financing agreement had provided a period of
advance notice even as brief as 48 hours, court would have decided case differently. Id. at
763.
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reasonable in the particular situation. 72 By including in the loan agreement
a short but objectively reasonable period of notice prior to terminating a
discretionary line of credit, the lender will discourage courts from imposing
a period of notice that conflicts with the express provision of the loan

agreement. 173
In addition to striving to prepare loan documents that clearly reflect
the understanding between the parties, a lender also should avoid harsh
contractual terms that the lender does not intend to enforce against the
borrower. 174 Harsh or threatening contract terms place the lender in an
unfavorable light and may convince a judge or a jury that the lender was
not contracting in good faith with the borrower. 7 5 By including temperate
and realistic provisions in the contract, the lender does not risk antagonizing
a judge or a jury.'7 6 Finally, lenders periodically should review loan documents with legal counsel to ensure that the provisions of the documents
77
conform with present law.
Although in cases that involve the obligation of good faith courts
primarily focus on the terms of the loan agreement, a lender interested in
avoiding a borrower's allegations that the lender breached an implied
obligation of good faith also must reevaluate the lender's behavior in
discretionary loan situations. 7 8 At all times during a lending relationship,
a lender's written and verbal communications with the borrower should be
temperate, objective, and businesslike. 7 9 In addition, lenders should maintain complete borrower files.8 0 These borrower files should contain all
relevant correspondence including periodic file memoranda.' The loan
officer that is primarily responsible for the problem loan should prepare
172. See infra note 172 and accompanying text (stating that courts are less likely to impose
court's own notice requirement upon lender if loan agreement includes reasonable notice
period).
173. See U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1987) (stating that contracting parties may define reasonable
requirements of good faith performance within terms of contract).
174. See Capello, Banking Malpractice?, CAsE & COM., Sept.-Oct. 1986, at 3, 6-7 (stating
that because of recent increase in lender liability cases, lenders must treat borrowers reasonably
and fairly).
175. See id. (stating that judges and juries may scrutinize fairness and reasonableness of
lender's behavior in credit transactions).
176. Id.
177. See Moss, Borrowers Fight Back with Lender Liability, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1, 1987, at
64, 72 (discussing importance of legal counsel in each step of collection process).
178. See Capello, supra note 173, at 6-7 (stating that sound business principles require
that lender behave professionally at all times in credit transaction).
179. Id.
180. See Moss, supra note 176, at 72 (stating importance that lender retain complete
documentation of all pertinent conversations and lender's plan of action in preparing successful
lender's defense against borrowers' claims in lender liability actions); but see Swartz, Lender
Liability, U.S. BANKER, May 1986, at 10, 22 (stating that lender's tendency to keep extensive
borrower files is harmful to lender because borrower may subpoena lender's files and use this
information against lender).
181. See Moss, supra note 176, at 72 (discussing importance of documenting pertinent
developments in lender-borrower relationship).
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file memoranda that honestly and objectively assess the borrower's present
status, summarize related conversations with the borrower, and outline the

2
lender's proposal to address the situation.1
To prevent personal bias, committees should review an individual loan
officer's decision to call a loan or terminate a line of credit.8 3 Before
implementing any enforcement action against a borrower, the lender should
review the borrower's file and audit all pertinent loan documents. 184 If the
lender discovers any irregularities during the lender's review of the borrower's file and loan documentation, the lender should confer with legal counsel

before instituting any collection action against the borrower.8 5 If possible,
the lender also should provide the borrower reasonable notice of the
86
impending enforcement action.

Throughout the collection process, the lender should be sensitive to the
borrower's interests and concerns. 8 7 Above all, the lender must remember

that a judge or jury later may scrutinize the lender's behavior during the
collection process.' 88 The lender, therefore, must make every effort to foster
fair dealing when exercising discretion in the collection process.8 9
The U.C.C. requires lenders, like all parties to commercial contracts,

to perform contractual obligations in good faith.' 90 Although the U.C.C.
prohibits contracting parties from totally disclaiming good faith obligations
in contracts, in deference to the express terms of the parties' written
agreement, the U.C.C. allows parties to define a reasonable standard of
good faith that will govern the relationship between the contracting parties.19'
Despite the U.C.C.'s deference to reasonable standards of good faith

182. See supra notes 179-80 (discussing importance of lender's objective documentation
of developments in lender-borrower relationship).
183. See Swartz, supra note 179, at 22 (stating importance that lender not grant individual
loan officers sole authority to call loan or terminate line of credit). In K.M.C. the jury
considered evidence that Irving Trust's loan officer may have based his decision to terminate
K.M.C.'s line of credit upon personality conflict. K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d
752, 761 (6th Cir. 1985).
184. See Swartz, supra note 179, at 22 (stating that sound business practices require that
lender be fully apprised of both borrower's and lender's status in light of borrower's changed
financial position).
185. See Moss, supra note 176, at 72 (discussing importance of legal counsel in each step
of loan collection process).
186. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text (stating that sound business principles
require that lenders treat borrowers fairly and reasonably).
187. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text (stating that lenders must be reasonable
and fair in dealing with borrowers).
188. See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text (stating that judges and juries may
scrutinize fairness and reasonableness of lender's behavior in credit transactions).
189. See supra notes 161-87 and accompanying text (stating that lenders should adhere to
standards of fair dealing to prevent borrowers from alleging that lender breached obligation
of good faith and fair dealing).
190. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text (discussing good faith requirement that
U.C.C. implies in every contract that U.C.C. governs).
191. See supra note 12-14 and accompanying text (discussing U.C.C.'s deference to
contract terms establishing reasonable standards of good faith).
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performance that contracting parties set forth in written agreements, the
courts in Reid and K.M.C. applied the U.C.C.'s good faith obligation to
alter the reasonable discretionary rights that the loan agreement granted to
the lenders in Reid and K.M.C. 192 In light of the decisions in Reid and
K.M.C., lenders must take steps to ensure that courts will not impose the
obligation of good faith to alter the express terms of loan agreements. 93
By preparing loan agreements that clearly reflect intentions of the parties
and by behaving in a businesslike manner, lenders can reduce the possibility
that courts will employ the U.C.C.'s obligation to rewrite the express terms
of the loan agreement that governs the relationship between a lender and a
94
borrower. 1
KATHLEEN S. McLEROY

192. See supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text (discussing First Circuit's application
of U.C.C.'s good faith obligation to alter lender's express contractual right to demand full
repayment in Reid); supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text (discussing Sixth Circuit's
applications of U.C.C.'s good faith obligation to alter lender's express contractual right to
refuse to advance funds to borrower without prior notice in K.M.C.).
193. See supra notes 161-88 and accompanying text (discussing measures that lender can
employ to reduce possibility that courts will impose good faith obligation to alter express
contract terms).
194. See supra notes 161-76 and accompanying text (stating that lender's use of fair and
unequivocal contract provisions may prevent courts from altering contracts between lenders
and borrowers).

